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Managing the Academic Racehorse: Bioaccountability,
Surveillance, and the Crafting of Docile Faculty in Mexican
Universities
Blanca Minerva Torres-Olave and María Elena Torres-Olave
Abstract
In this essay, we consider the “petty” managerial technologies of audit and surveillance that shape the lives of
Mexican faculty and introduce the term bioaccountability to refer to the growing use of biometric control
mechanisms implemented around the world to monitor faculty activities and performance. We draw on
personal experience at three Mexican public universities to illustrate the chilling impact of encroaching
(bio)accountability policies on academic culture, including the gradual erosion of academic freedom.
On May 6, 2014, the faculty union at the Universidad Nacional de Trujillo in Peru called for a seventytwo-hour general strike to protest against the introduction of biometric controls to monitor faculty presence
on campus during work hours.1 The strike was the latest in a series of conflicts between the faculty and
university administration dating back to 2011, when law students donated a fingerprint scanner to the School
of Law and demanded that it be used as a deterrent to faculty absenteeism. In June 2011, an official resolution
was adopted to introduce biometric controls for faculty across all UNT schools and colleges.2 In the ensuing

1

Lucyana Zavaleta Urtecho, “Docentes de la UNT: Control biométrico es cortina de humo.” La República, May 7,
2014, http://larepublica.pe/archivo/790887-docentes-de-la-unt-control-biometrico-es-cortina-de-humo.
2
“Universidad Nacional de Trujillo (UNT) controlará asistencia de catedráticos usando relojes biométricos,”
Educación en Red, May 7, 2014, https://www.educacionenred.pe/noticia/?portada=51752#ixzz55hMWByjr.
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media debate, UNT administration defended the implementation of the fingerprint readers as a measure to
improve faculty accountability and transparency. The faculty union representatives countered that, while they
supported the scrutiny and disciplining of delinquent faculty, they objected to the lack of informed consent
regarding the use or protection of their biometric data, the coercion of faculty into providing their
fingerprints, and the high visibility of biometric controls as a smokescreen for broader instances of corruption
at the institution.3
In 2013, a similar situation played out at the Universidad de Granada, in Spain. In an open letter, the
faculty union challenged the administration’s plan to use biometric controls to audit faculty presence on
campus.4 The union criticized the failure to consult the faculty about the new policy and argued that the use
of biometric controls was invasive, punitive, and tarnished the public reputation of the entire faculty by
implying that absenteeism was endemic on campus instead of a rare occurrence.5 Moreover, the union called
into question the decision to make administrative and campus services staff responsible for overseeing faculty
compliance with the new system—a situation that would not only increase the former’s workload but also
turn them into a de facto instrument of faculty surveillance.6
These two examples highlight a growing trend in universities around the world: the use of biometric
controls to monitor academic staff. In this essay, we refer to such measures as bioaccountability, and position
them as part of broader, hegemonic discourses of accountability, transparency, and efficiency, whose de facto
intent is to create a docile, selectively productive academic body. Focusing in the case of Mexico, we explore
the “petty” managerial technologies of audit and surveillance—of which bioaccountability measures are a
logical if perverse extension—that shape the lives of faculty. We draw on personal experience at three
Mexican public universities to illustrate their chilling impact on academic culture, including the gradual
erosion of academic freedom.
Of course, institutions and institutional actors have a duty to be responsible, open, and honest about
their operations and their contributions to society. Yet our point in this essay is that the wholesale, uncritical
consumption of accountability discourses can mask dynamics that effectively threaten academic freedom,
although not in the overt, sometimes violent forms of academic repression documented around the world. In
3

Zavaleta Urtecho, “Docentes de la UNT.”
Federación de Empleados y Empleadas de los Servicios Públicos, Unión General de Trabajadores (FeSP UGT),
Universidad de Granada, “Campaña recogida firmas control presencial,” La Cafetera, November 11, 2013,
https://feteugtugr.wordpress.com/2013/11/27/campana-recogida-firmas-control-presencial/.
5
FeSP UGT, Universidad de Granada, “Sobrecarga horaria y control presencial: Celebrada reunión de profesores,”
September 19, 2013, https://ugtugr.wordpress.com/2013/09/19/sobrecarga-horaria-y-control-presencialcelebrada-reunion-de-profesores/.
6
Ibid.
4
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this sense, our intent in this essay is not to shift the focus away from such egregious violations of academic
freedom but rather to extend our understanding of how seemingly benign audit and accountability
technologies can be deployed as instruments of faculty control and docilization without inviting comparisons
to overtly repressive regimes.
As numerous scholars have pointed out, the restructuring of the academic labor force and the ensuing
growth of non-tenure-track (and nonunionized) faculty ranks is one of the most effective means to diminish
collective action and weaken the protections of academic freedom. Yet where completely eliminating the
protections of tenure to retain highly skilled knowledge producers may not be politically feasible, the need to
reign in and control faculty remains. A managerial ideology that embeds academics in a labor environment
with high degrees of audit, inspection, and surveillance is ideal for this purpose since, given sufficient time, it
produces docile bodies “in a self-reinforcing process of self-discipline through which [faculty] invest
themselves psychically and emotionally” in dominant discourses of proper professional behavior.7 In the next
section we extend this idea through a brief overview of Michel Foucault’s notion of biopower and how it
applies to the management of the academic workforce.

Biopower and the Academic Racehorse
Foucault argued that in absolutist regimes, governing had as its main objective repelling threats to the
absolute authority of the king over the territories to which he laid claim. In contrast, in modern, liberal
societies, governing is concerned not with territory or sovereignty but rather with the productive welfare of
the population. To govern a liberal state means “exercising toward its inhabitants, and the wealth of behavior
of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of the family over his
household and his goods.”8 In this conceptualization of government, property and territory are no more than
useful variables in the management of the complex formed by humans and things. Rather than thinking of
power as a top-down planning process emanating from state agencies, Foucault stressed the need, as
Cameron McCarthy and Greg Dimitriadis put it, to “engage with a power that does not simply prohibit or

7

Rebecca Boden and Debbie Epstein, “Managing the Research Imagination? Globalisation and Research in Higher
Education,” Globalisation, Societies and Education 4, no. 2 (2006): 226–28,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14767720600752619.
8
Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Essential Foucault, edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (New
York: New Press, 2003), 234.
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repress, a power that is dispersed, that circulates—a power that does not exist outside relations but produces
relations.”9 In other words, a mentality of government, or governmentality.
After Foucault, Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose conceptualized power as “productive of meanings, of
interventions, of entities, of processes, of objects, of written traces and of lives.”10 Their main concern was
contemporary programs, techniques, and strategies of governmentality, what they call the “little engineers of
the human soul, and their mundane knowledges, techniques and procedures.”11 As such, power is distributed
along loosely affiliated networks of interests and materialized in instruments of financial control, performance
measurement, and audit applied to the faculty’s teaching and research functions. The growth of managerial
professionals tasked with oversight of these tasks is an important element in the legitimization and
normalization of these regimes of audit and surveillance.
Equally important to this normalization is that individuals learn to identify their current position, to
“calibrate themselves in relation to ‘where they should be,’ and devise ways of getting from one state to the
other.”12 That is, it is important that they learn self-discipline and compliance within the system. According to
Foucault, the technologies of discipline seek to dissociate power from the body in two inextricable ways: (1)
by channeling power into aptitudes or capacities that lead to desirable increases in terms of economic utility
and (2) by diverting the flow of energy away from undesirable uses and behaviors. The ultimate goal of this
biopower is to “have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that
they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines.”13
Faculty, however, with the historical charge and protections of shared governance and academic freedom,
present a unique challenge to managerial expectations of docility. As knowledge producers they fulfill a
crucial role in maximizing the innovation and competitiveness so often presented as the raison d’être behind
neoliberal restructuring in education. As such, from a managerial perspective, independence of mind and
action are desirable attributes when channeled into knowledge creation and transfer. Yet the same
independent streak, especially when linked to collective action, makes them difficult to govern.14 The

9

Cameron McCarthy and Greg Dimitriadis, “Governmentality and the Sociology of Education: Media, Educational
Policy and the Politics of Resentment,” in Race, Identity and Representation in Education, edited by Cameron
McCarthy, Warren Crichlow, Greg Dimitriadis, and Nadine Dolby (New York: Routledge, 2005), 323.
10
Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social and Personal Life
(Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2008), 9.
11
Ibid., 2.
12
Ibid., 67.
13
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Random House, 1979), 138.
14
Boden and Epstein, “Managing the Research Imagination,” 231.
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problem, from a managerial standpoint, is how to implement a racehorse model of academic productivity:
They must gallop at top speed, but only when and where you want them to go.

Incentivos as a Biopower Tool in Mexican Universities
Scholars like Estela Bensimon and Imanol Ordorika have called attention to the widespread use of
performance-based funding in Mexico as one such biopower technique for steering faculty. During the wave
of structural reforms and the introduction of “new public management” techniques in the mid-1980s and
1990s, the Mexican government introduced a series of programs to encourage high-level performance of both
institutions and individual faculty. Among the most prominent programs targeted at the faculty level were the
National Researchers System (SNI, Sistema Nacional de Investigadores), the Program for the Improvement
of the Professoriate (PROMEP, Programa de Mejoramiento del Profesorado), Academic Bodies (ABs), and
institutional merit-pay programs (IMPPs).15 While PROMEP and ABs are targeted programs that provide
funding for infrastructure and support research-related activities, the SNI and IMPPs were conceived as
faculty merit-pay programs—incentivos—for faculty who meet research (and to a lesser degree, teaching and
service) productivity targets.
Initially introduced as temporary measures to help faculty maintain their standard of living during one of
the country’s worst financial crises,16 merit-pay programs like the SNI and IMPPs have become wellestablished, inextricable parts of both the funding structure and the rhythm of academic life in Mexico.
Despite being targeted at individual faculty, participation in these programs has important implications for
institutional accreditation and funding more broadly. Because federal allocations based on student enrollment
are kept at a bare subsistence levels, institutions are expected to supplement their income through
performance-based funding initiatives like the Integral Program for Institutional Improvement (PIFI,
Programa Integral de Fortalecimiento Institucional) and the National Graduate Program Register (PNPC,

15

For a detailed history and description of these programs, see Jesús Francisco Galaz-Fontes and Manuel GilAntón, “The Impact of Merit-Pay Systems on the Work and Attitudes of Mexican Academics,” Higher Education 66,
no. 3 (2013): 360–62.
16
Jesús Francisco Galaz-Fontes, Laura Elena Padilla-González, Manuel Gil-Antón, Juan José Sevilla-García, José Luis
Arcos-Vega, Jorge Martínez-Stack, Sergio Martínez-Romo, Leonardo Jiménez-Loza, and María Elena BarreraBustillos, “Mexican Academics at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: Who Are They and How Do They Perceive
Their Work, Institutions and Public Policies (A Preliminary Analysis),” RIHE International Seminar Reports: The
Changing Academic Profession in International Comparative and Quantitative Perspectives 12 (September 2008):
347, http://ids.hof.uni-halle.de/documents/t1782.pdf#page=354.
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Padrón Nacional de Posgrados de Calidad). Eligibility in these programs is, in turn, largely contingent on
faculty performance as indicated by their SNI, IMPP, and PROMEP status.17
Thus, since faculty participation in merit-pay schemes has a significant impact on an institution’s ability to
secure basic operational funding, there is a built-in institutional inducement to ensure that faculty meet the
productivity targets required by these programs. Something similar takes place for individual faculty. At most
institutions, the base salaries of faculty do not keep pace with inflation and increases in living expenses; this
creates a powerful enticement for faculty to pursue merit-pay eligibility. Moreover, while the base salaries of
faculty across all ranks in the prestige ladder created by the SNI and IMPPs status are relatively similar, for
those at the top levels, income from merit-pay programs can represent up to 50 percent of individual faculty
members’ total annual compensation18—a staggering proportion by any reckoning.
Although merit-pay schemes are neither new nor unique to Mexico, the manner of their implementation
in Mexican higher education is believed to have had a significant and detrimental impact on academic labor
and culture. With such high-stakes implications for individual income, the programs foster a
hyperindividualistic academic culture and the loss of faculty solidarity. The imperative of competing for a
livable wage creates subtle but powerful barriers to the disinterested pursuit of knowledge and to academic
freedom, as “the mind-set and practices of academics as individuals and collectively change radically to fit
into a context where monetary value is attached to academic products according to how much they weigh on
the globalized scale of prestige and excellence.”19
The extensive bureaucratic apparatus needed to run the multiple, mutually enforcing evaluation and audit
programs—of which merit-pay schemes are a central component—has grown into a technology of control
and surveillance with the power to steer academic work toward activities and products that generate the
greatest economic benefit. As a biopower tool, the estímulos are formidable in steering a faculty historically
known for its independence through positive incentives that invite compliance and complicity.20 In contrast,
with its focus on negative reinforcement, bioaccountability emerges as the “shadow” side of audit and
surveillance regimes. We now turn to our experience to highlight how the introduction of fingerprint readers

17

Galaz-Fontes and Gil-Antón, “The Impact of Merit-Pay Systems,” 361–62.
Ibid., 366.
19
Estela Bensimon and Imanol Ordorika, “Mexico’s Estímulos: Faculty Compensation Based on Piecework,” in The
University, State, and Market: The Political Economy of Globalization in the Americas, edited by Robert A. Rhodes
and Carlos Alberto Torres (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 265.
20
After all, there is no need to forcibly silence academics who are too preoccupied with the endless minutiae upon
which their earnings depend.
18
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speaks to a broader managerial concern with faculty control, which encroaches on key aspects of academic
labor.

Bioaccountability as Creeping Managerial Overreach
To the best of our knowledge, unlike the cases at the Universidad Nacional de Trujillo or Universidad de
Granada, the introduction of the fingerprint scanners as a bioaccountability measure has not been met with
overt faculty resistance at Mexican institutions.21 Blanca was an adjunct faculty member at the Universidad
Autónoma de Chihuahua when the fingerprint scanners were first introduced in the early 2000s. There was a
quiet mundanity about the process: Upon arriving on campus one morning, faculty and students noted that a
new device had been installed by the main administrative office in our building. The device was
nonoperational for several weeks, during which rumors swirled about its intended use. Eventually, faculty
learned that they would be required to scan their fingerprints upon arriving in the building and before leaving
for the day. Faculty grumbled among themselves about the new policy, but there was never an organized
attempt to push back against it.
For adjunct faculty like Blanca—whose salaries were determined by the number of class hours taught per
semester, with no compensation for class preparation, time spent grading assignments, meeting with students,
and so on—the measure seemed especially intrusive and ominous, since no information was made available
about how the data gleaned from our entries would be used, for whom, and for what purposes other than
ensuring professors were in fact in class at the designated times. Nor was there ever any communication
about how our biodata would be stored or protected. Faculty were simply expected to comply or else have
their pay withheld indefinitely.
In María Elena’s case, the biometric control policy was already in place by the time she was hired at her
current institution22—a regional satellite of the Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez (UACJCuauhtémoc). However, both the requirements of the policy and its enforcement have gradually intensified
over time, resulting in a far-reaching bioaccountability and surveillance apparatus. For example, during María
Elena’s first semester on campus, the policy was that faculty must scan their fingerprints at the end of each
class. As of this writing, the policy is that faculty must scan their fingerprints at the beginning and the end of
class. Late or missing scans receive a penalty fee calculated as a percentage of total class time and deducted
21

This was certainly the case in our experience at the three institutions we focus on in this essay.
As was the case at the UACH, new faculty did not receive any information about how the data would be used,
stored, or protected.
22
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from a professor’s monthly paycheck unless his or her presence during the entire class period can be verified.
How verified? These days, the program director can vouch for the faculty member and manually overturn a
late or missing scan (as often happens when a professor is running from one class to the next). A few years
ago, an additional measure was in place: A prefect whose function was to walk the hallways to monitor that
faculty were in fact in class at the designated times. This position was eventually phased out when it became
evident that faculty absenteeism or chronic lateness was in fact rare. Regardless, the fingerprint scanners (and
the financial penalty scheme) remained.
Other measures of bioaccountability have likewise become more restrictive over time. During María
Elena’s first weeks in her program, she made sure to register her presence in class through the fingerprint
scanner and to maintain regular office hours to meet with students. Every day she worked on research- and
service-related activities in her office for a few hours before switching to working from home. A few weeks
into the semester, an administrator23 publicly admonished her, stating that all faculty were required to remain
on campus for a full eight-hour shift. María Elena explained that such a policy was not made explicit in her
contract and that—in addition to never failing to fulfill any of her teaching or service duties—there was
documentation available (for example, emails) showing that she was in fact working from home. The eighthour shift requirement, she was told, was nonnegotiable. Not wanting to antagonize the administration, in the
next few days she rearranged her schedule to arrive on campus at 7:00 a.m.—her peak productivity time—
break for lunch at noon, then end her shift at 4:00 p.m. A few days later she was told this too was
unacceptable, since there would be no administrative staff on hand to verify her arrival time. She finally
settled on an 8:00 a.m.–4:00 p.m. schedule with no lunch break, after a somewhat baffling exchange about her
right to determine whether and when to pause for food.
It would be easy to dismiss the managerial preoccupation with academic feeding times and the like as
comical and petty, as indeed it is—on the surface. Yet as part of a cumulative, pervasive, sometimes opaque
control apparatus, its implications are chilling. Consider, for example, how enforcement of the eight-hour
shift for professors is achieved. Given the close distribution of office space, oftentimes direct observation by
the administrator is enough to determine that a faculty member is absent. However, because this is a small
campus, it is also common to rely on custodial staff to monitor and report on the whereabouts of faculty on

23

Because of the sensitive nature of this information and the possibility of retaliation against María Elena we avoid
naming the specific administrative position in this and related examples.
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college grounds. This practice is well-known to faculty, but being categorically unofficial, it is hard to establish
how and under what circumstances it takes place.24
Still, this level of surveillance is not the most extreme example of which the authors have direct
experience. Some years back, María Elena was hired as a tenure-track professor at Universidad de la Sierra
Juárez, a teaching-oriented institution in southern Mexico. The bioaccountability measures there were far
more stringent than anything either of us has experienced elsewhere. The class schedule was organized in
such a way that all classes took place during morning hours, and afternoons were reserved for course prep as
well as student- and service-related activities.25 The strict observance of business hours was enforced by
mandatory fingerprint scans at four designated times: At 8:00 a.m. upon arrival on campus, at 12:00 and 1:00
p.m. before and after lunch break, and at 5:00 p.m. before leaving campus. Late or missing scans would incur
in financial penalties automatically deducted from the professor’s paycheck. In an extreme version of the
short-lived initiative at the UACJ-Cuauhtémoc, at the Universidad de la Sierra Juárez a dedicated cadre of
prefects was on hand to monitor compliance with the following policies during office hours:



If not in class, faculty must be in their office space at all times. Exceptions included
bathroom breaks and attending meetings and other official business on campus. Faculty
who were observed away from their offices at any other times were reported and
formally reprimanded.



No bathroom breaks during class time.



No private conversations with colleagues allowed, either in the office space or in the
hallways.



No meetings with students allowed unless on strictly coursework-related business.



Faculty with a legitimate medical reason to be away from campus must obtain four
signatures (that is, vice chancellor, human resources, graduate college, and the dean of

24

This calls to mind the faculty union complaint at the Universidad de Granada, where the administration sought
to make personal administrativo y de servicios (PAS, administrative and campus services staff) responsible for
monitoring compliance with the biometric control system. See FeSP UGT Universidad de Granada, “Sobrecarga
horaria.”
25
This is a common scheduling practice at Mexican universities. See Blanca Minerva Torres-Olave, “Imaginative
Geographies: Identity, Difference, and English as the Language of Instruction in a Mexican University Program,”
Higher Education 63, no. 3 (2012): 317–35.
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students) to be excused with no salary penalty. (Some faculty chose to simply stay home
and take the salary penalty.)

The official justification for these measures was that faculty should dedicate themselves exclusively to
university-related work (which at this institution meant primarily teaching), and that without this type of
enforcement, rampant absenteeism would ensue. However, behind closed doors faculty conjectured that the
policy stemmed from the administration’s desire to curtail faculty involvement in political activism—in
particular any activity associated with the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, the powerful
teacher’s union in Mexico. The most blatant giveaway was the presence of armed guards at the campus gate,
whose known—but unofficial—duty was to prevent students from leaving the premises when there was so
much as a whisper of a teacher’s strike or some other form of organized protest in the region.
As one can imagine, compliance with these policies had a direct impact not only on faculty morale but
also on their ability to carry out essential aspects of their work. Although faculty were technically free to
pursue research and publication, the strict bioaccountability measures meant that conducting research-related
activities was difficult, if not impossible. Faculty who wished to attend conferences or professional
development activities away from town—as María Elena did—were told they could do so, but that the days
or hours they spent away from campus would be deducted from their paychecks. Fieldwork was similarly
impacted, as being away from campus during office hours also signaled noncompliance with bioaccountability
measures.
Unsurprisingly, the institution had a dismal faculty retention record. With no union or structure for
collective voice, and subject to an authoritative, repressive managerial culture, new faculty soon found the
conditions intolerable. A morbid pastime among the hardier professors was to place bets on how long a new
hire would last. The record for fastest departure was one week. María Elena left at the end of her first
semester.

The Normalization of Bioaccountability as a Threat to Academic Freedom
The bioaccountability measures we describe above are troubling on several levels. At the most basic level,
there is a Taylorist logic behind these policies, an assumption that getting faculty to follow rigid timetables in
which specific tasks are performed, completed, and accounted for will lead to greater productivity. This logic
entails a willful misunderstanding of the reality of academic work: learning is not linear and does not occur
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exclusively in the classroom; the ability to communicate with and exchange ideas with colleagues is a central
aspect of innovation and intellectual crosspollination; flexible work environments can foster productivity and
creativity, and so on. 26 The intensive monitoring and regulation of academic staff results in an encroachment
on academic life that may in fact harm faculty productivity and stifle creative, innovative thought. In setting
up conditions where productivity and efficiency is fetishized and both creativity and critical thought are
discouraged, bioaccountability effectively precludes the possibility of the type of “virtualities”—“moments in
which the creation of new concepts allows a new problematic (that is, new kinds of questions and the
intellectual structures around them) to take hold”—that Bruce Janz has eloquently argued are only possible in
the presence of academic freedom.27
In addition, some of these policies, especially those that involve placing restrictions on faculty’s ability to
communicate with colleagues and students, may in fact impinge on basic liberties under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights28 as well as under the Mexican Constitution, which states, “The right to
peacefully associate or assemble for any licit purpose cannot be restricted..”29 The presence of armed guards
to keep students from attending social protests cannot be construed as anything but in violation of their right
to peaceful association. Yet even the less extreme measures signal a level of managerial control that is difficult
for outsiders to comprehend. The larger question is, why, in a country where universities have historically
held significant political power, this level of overt and covert control over faculty goes unchallenged. Here it
is crucial to consider the broader context in which bioaccountability techniques come to be implemented and
normalized. At all three institutions, these techniques took place in the name of greater transparency and
productivity, thus placing them on an equal footing with the expansive audit trail for research, teaching, and
service productivity that faculty already maintain in the complex system of performance-based funding,
including the SNI, PROMEP, ABs, IMPPs, PIFI, and PNPC, among others. The incentivos programs and the
bioaccountability measures described in this essay thus represent two complementary sides of the faculty
steering mechanism: the carrot and the stick.
One of the most problematic aspects of these bioaccountability policies—especially in their most extreme
versions—is thus how easily they become part of the fabric of the broader efficiency and accountability
regime. There is an element of personal shame at play, in that questioning or protesting these policies may be
26

Not to mention that the requirement to be physically present for eight hours straight assumes a body
unconstrained by physical need or limitation, as well as one that can extract itself from the concerns of family care.
In Mexican society this still typically means a male, able-bodied subject.
27
Bruce Janz, “Free Space in the Academy,” Journal of Academic Freedom 7 (2016): 1–17.
28
United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 20.
29
Mexican Constitution (amend. 2015), title I, chap. 1. art. 9.
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construed as evidence of offending faculty trying to cover their tracks. Academic freedom is curtailed not
through any overt challenge to the faculty’s ability to speak their minds either in their research (or even
activism) but rather through the establishment of a docility regime that effectively bypasses the need for more
overt displays of power or repression.

The Tame Faculty
In Mexico, resistance to the early (and since refined) instruments to monitor faculty performance and to
establish aspirational hierarchies of productivity (with monetary rewards attached to them) is now virtually nil.
Is the same true of any real, organized, collective opposition to the type of bioaccountability described in this
essay? It is difficult to tell. There is evidence that it is possible for faculty to challenge these measures. Faculty
at the UACJ-Cuauhtémoc campus have recently resisted administrative calls for additional bioaccountability
requirements, including mandatory fingerprint scans upon arrival on and departure from campus, on the
grounds that they would negatively impact research activities such as fieldwork and conference attendance.30
This is a heartening development, and it brings to the fore the need for overt, collective, organized action by
faculty in resisting policies with such a deleterious impact on academic culture. Much like a muscle, the
collective voice of faculty must be exercised regularly, lest it atrophy.
The consequences of losing that muscle memory are cause for concern. As faculty grow used to more
authoritative managerial styles and expectations, they become increasingly unable or unwilling to challenge
policies that infringe directly on more traditional understandings of academic freedom, including the ability to
make curricular decisions and determine the criteria under which students' learning and evaluation takes
place.. Blanca’s experience as an adjunct at Universidad Autónoma de Chihuahua speaks to this. In the mid2000s, not long after the biometric controls were introduced, the university was under strong political
pressure to admit more students. Some of the larger, pressing societal concerns in the state of Chihuahua—
mounting violence and insecurity related to the war on drug cartels—led to widespread concerns about the
university’s inability to provide seats for the growing number of high school graduates. To address this
discontent, the university rector issued an edict to expand admissions across all academic units. Blanca’s
program, which specialized in training EFL teachers and translators, was charged with doubling enrollments
in the coming fall. This was concerning to faculty in two ways: first, with no additional investment in
infrastructure, the school building could not physically hold a twofold student increase in classrooms that

30

As was the case during María Elena’s time at the Universidad de la Sierra Juárez.

13

Managing the Academic Racehorse
Blanca Minerva Torres-Olave and María Elena Torres-Olave

were already at capacity. Second, being a program where applicants were expected to demonstrate a relatively
high written and oral English proficiency to be admitted, doubling the number of admissions would
effectively require the program to admit students who would struggle to keep up with coursework even in the
first semester of classes. Without additional teaching staff to accommodate a much larger cohort (with a very
different instructional profile), the quality of instruction would be adversely affected, especially as students
moved from introductory courses into the intensive (and English-only) seminar-style upper classes.
The program faculty scheduled a meeting with the academic director for the university, where as a group
they expressed these concerns. The academic director took a belligerent tone and stated that the requirement
to double enrollments was not up for discussion, nor would there be additional funds for staff or
infrastructure. Blanca asked what faculty were supposed to do about the 50 percent of incoming students
who would be clearly ill-prepared to cope with first-year course requirements.
“Flunk them,” he shrugged.
“So, we’ll essentially be admitting students, taking their time and tuition money, knowing full well they
will not make it past their first semester. How is this a responsible policy?”
“That’s not your problem.”
“It is our problem, we’re here to teach.”
With a sharp look he spat back, “Who the hell are you?”
As an adjunct faculty member—a nobody, as far as the academic director was concerned—the fact that
Blanca was silenced is troubling but perhaps unsurprising. Yet the silence that followed was telling. No one in
the group, which included at least four tenured faculty, dared follow that exchange. They had much to lose,
politically speaking, from direct confrontation with upper administration. The meeting ended soon after. This
was a clear example of the de facto inability of faculty to advocate for the welfare of students, to speak against
unreasonable expectations of efficiency and productivity, and to demand adequate support to perform the
tasks expected of them. The alarming aspect of these practices is how they gradually, almost imperceptibly at
first, become normalized—and how subtly the same habit of acquiescence weakens resistance to further
encroachment on faculty labor and academic freedom.
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Concluding Thoughts: Context Matters
This final anecdote illustrates the importance of positional power when considering the normalization of
audit and surveillance regimes. Blanca’s experience reminds us that, as the protections of academic freedom
do not typically extend to contingent faculty, the latter may be especially vulnerable under authoritarian
managerialist regimes. Moreover, it is worth bearing in mind how tenured and tenure-track faculty are
incentivized to remain silent through both the positive and negative reinforcement mechanisms detailed in
this essay.
Likewise, an element that sometimes gets lost in discussions about academic freedom is the fact that
context matters. The invocation of context usually takes place in scholarly examinations of academic freedom
in different systems around the world, or in discussions concerning the inadequacy of US-centric definitions
of the term.31 However, it is just as important to consider how issues of institutional stratification, prestige,
and region may play a role in the uneven enforcement of academic freedom protections within a university
system. The fact that the examples of bioaccountability we discuss in this essay took place at regional
universities (or satellite campuses) rather than at some of the more powerful, prestigious institutions in the
country is significant. A similar escalation of bioaccountability measures might not be possible at flagship or
politically active campuses where faculty have a critical mass and a strong, collective voice.
Similarly, not all programs at the same institution may be impacted equally. At María Elena’s satellite
campus, the surveillance seems to be concentrated mostly in programs with a high research activity, and
which feature prominently in the institution’s accreditation and performance-based funding eligibility.
Considering the key role that such research-intensive programs may play in securing accreditation and
performance-based funds for the institution, it is not a stretch to see the bioaccountability measures as an
extension of institutional strategies to manage resource dependency. We hope this essay serves as a cautionary
tale of how, in practice, such strategies can become perverted, with deleterious effects on academic labor and
academic freedom.
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